Marquette Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 4 June 1940

Article 9

Security-Conditional Sale-Distinction Between
Mortgage and Conditional Sale
Joseph E. Tierney Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Joseph E. Tierney Jr., Security-Conditional Sale-Distinction Between Mortgage and Conditional Sale, 24 Marq. L. Rev. 224 (1940).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol24/iss4/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

an implied promise may arise from its use. Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N.H. 561 (1840).
Besides an express promise, acts which manifest an intention to be bound may
constitute ratification. Edgerly v. Shaw, 25 N.H. 514, 57 Am. Dec. 349 (1852).
A mere acknowledgement that a contract was made during infancy is not such
a manifestation. Thompson v. Lay, supra.
There may also be a conditional ratification but, until the condition is fulfilled, no action can be maintained. State v. Binder, 57 N.J.L. 374, 31 Atl. 215
(1894). And it has been held that the promise must be unconditional. Bresee v.
Stanley, 119 N.C. 76, 25 S.E. 870 (1896).
Part payment of an agreement after reaching majority without any other
evidence of an intent to ratify is no ratification. This is true because the part
payment is at best an ambiguous manifestation of intent. The payor may regard
his part payment as being all which, in fairness, he should pay. Robbins v. Eaton,
supra International Accountants Society v. Santana, 166 La. 671, 117 So. 768,
59 A.L.R. 276 (1928).
Therefore, where there was part payment, but the person "wrote nothing,
said nothing, and did nothing which bore on the question of intention," there
was no ratification. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N.Y. 188, 99
N.E. 722, 42 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1115 (1912); Hook v. Harmon Nat. Real Estate
Corp., 295 N.Y.S. 249, 250 App. Div. 689 (1937).
Courts are divided on the question whether there must be knowledge on the
part of the infant that his contract is voidable. The majority of the courts hold
that the infant need not have knowledge of his legal right to disaffirm since
such knowledge will be presumed by his acts. Rubin v. Strandberg, 288 Ill. 64, 122
N.E. 808, 5 A.L.R. 133 (1919); Clark v. Van Court, 100 Ind. 113, 50 Am. Rep.
774 (1884); Anderson v. Seward, 40 Ohio St. 325, 48 Am. Rep. 687 (1883);
Bestor v. Hickey, 71 Conn. 181, 41 Atl. 555 (1898). However, some courts hold
that the knowledge of the right to repudiate must be shown. Smith v. Mayo,
9 Mass. 62, 6 Am. Dec. 28 (1812) ; Tolar v. Marion County Lwnrber Co., 193 S.C.
274, 75 S.E. 545 (1912).
JOHN A. CALLAHAN.
Security-Conditional Sale-Distinction Between Mortgages and Conditional
Sale.-C advanced money to A, an oil prospector. A assigned his drilling
equipment to C. This assignment was not to become operative unless a certain

oil well did not produce. It did not produce. A died. B, a judgment creditor of
A, levied execution on the drilling equipment. A's administrator sued to restrain
execution alleging that the judgment was obtained by fraud. C intervened and
claimed title under the assignment. The court held this assignment to be, in
effect, a conditional sale which passed title to C upon the failure of the well to
produce, not a chattel mortgage as the defendant contended. Stroup v. Meyers,
(Indiana, 1939) 21 N.E. (2d) 75.
There is a difference in form between a conditional sale and a chattel mortgage which becomes important in determining the recording or filing requirements which must be observed. Differences in substantive rights exist also,
although it has been argued that since a conditional sale is simply a short cut
to a purchase money chattel mortgage and both transactions have the same purpose-security for the vendor-there should be no distinction in substantive
rights. Note (1922) 36 HARV. L. REv. 740; note (1929) 14 IOwA L. Rev. 329, 337.
The character of the instrument is determined by the intent of the parties
as manifested by the instrument itself and the surrounding circumstances. If
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there is a debt independent of the security transaction and if it is clear that no
sale was intended, the instrument is a chattel mortgage. Keystone Finance Corp.
v. Krueger, 17 F. (2d) 904 (C.C.A. 3d, 1927). A transaction which provided for
a deficiency judgment has been held a chattel mortgage even though the parties labelled the instrument a conditional sale contract. The instrument was held
to come within the chattel mortgage recording statute. Weber Showcase and
Fixture Co. v. Waugh, 42 F. (2d) 515 (W.D. Wash. 1930). Conversely, a conditional vendor was refused a deficiency judgment. Mills Novelty Co. v. Morett,
266 Mich. 451, 254 N.W. 164 (1934). But the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
which has been adopted in Wisconsin provides that if the proceeds of the resale
are not sufficient to pay the balance due on the purchase price the vendor may
recover the deficiency from the purchaser. Wis. STAT. (1939), §§ 122.22. Douglass
v. Ransont, 205 Wis. 439, 237 N.W. 260 (1931).
An equity of redemption is an incident of a chattel mortgage but not of a
conditional sale. Panchoff v. Heller, 176 Minn. 493, 223 N.W. 911 (1929). But
here also the Uniform Conditional Sales Act narrows the difference between
chattel mortgages and conditional sales, since under it the purchaser has an
equity of redemption of ten days after retaking the goods if the vendor fails
to give at least twenty days notice of his intention to retake the goods. Wis.
STAT. (1939) §§ 122.18, 122.19, 122.20.
The transaction in the principal case was hardly the usual type of conditional
sale, but it seems clear that a sale rather than a mortgage was intended. Although
the transaction was designed to secure a person who had advanced money, it does
not appear that a debt had been created. Rather, there was an alternative provision contemplated by the instrument. If the well produced, those who had
helped to finance the project were to share in the profits; otherwise, they were to
get a certain amount of the equipment which their money had bought. Title was
to pass to them on the happening of a certain event. There was no debt. Neither
a deficiency judgment nor an equity or redemption was contemplated.
JosEPH E. TnmEY,Ja.

Wills-Adopted Son as "Lawful Issue."--An appeal was taken from an order
denying appellant's claim as the adopted son of the adopted son of the testatrix
to take under her will, as the "lawful issue" of the adopted son. The Minnesota
statutes defined "issue" as meaning the lineal descendants of an ancestor. The
court held that adoption gave the adopted child the status of issue under a
statute (Mason Minn. St. 1927 § 8630) which provides that "Upon adoption
such child shall become the legal child of the persons adopting him, and they
shall become his legal parents, with all the rights and duties between them of
natural parents and legitimate child. By virtue of such adoption he shall inherit
from his adopting parents or their relatives the same as though he were the
legitimate child of such parents . . .". The court reasoned that the statute conferred upon the adopted child the status of a natural one and, referring to
In re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925), added that the
adopted child is a "lineal descendant." It re Holden's Trust, (Minn. 1940) 291
N.W. 104.
Generally, whenever the question of the rights of adopted children to inherit
from their adoptive parents has arisen, the courts have been very liberal and
have treated such children as natural children. In O'Connell v. Powers, 291 Mass.
153, 197 N.E. 162 (1935), the court declared that the word "issue" includes

